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Abstract: Spontaneous Reporting System (SRS) has been widely established to collect adverse drug events. Thus, SRS promotes the detection and analysis of ADR 
(adverse drug reactions), such as the FDA Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS). The SRS data needs to be provided to researchers. Meanwhile, the SRS data is 
publicly available to facilitate the study of ADR detection and analysis. In general, SRS data contains private information of some individual characteristics. Before the 
information is published, it is necessary to anonymize private information in the SRS data to prevent disclosure of individual privacy. There are many privacy protection 
methods. The most classic method for protecting SRS data is called as PPMS. However, in the real world, SRS data is growing dynamically and needs to be published 
regularly. In this case, PPMS has some shortcomings in the memory consumption, anonymity efficiency, data update and data security. To remove these shortcomings, 
we propose an Efficient Q-value Zero-leakage protection Scheme in SRS regularly publishing private data, called EQZS. EQZS can deal with almost all of potential attacks. 
Meanwhile, EQZS removes the shortcomings of PPMS. The experimental results show that our scheme EQZS solves the problem of privacy leakage in SRS regularly 
publishing private data. Meanwhile, EQZS significantly outperforms PPMS on the efficiency of memory consumption, privacy anonymity and data update. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Although drugs are essential for people to cure 
diseases, taking drugs may be accompanied by serious 
adverse drug reactions (ADR). A new drug has to go 
through a series of clinical trials before it enters the 
market. Unfortunately, the number of volunteers involved 
in drug trials is quite limited. Thus, it is difficult to prior 
collect all ADR in the pre-marketing stage. Most 
developed countries have established spontaneous 
reporting system (SRS) to collect ADR. SRS supports the 
analysis and detection of ADR data, such as the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA)’s FAERS [1], the UK’s 
Yellow Card scheme [2], Canada’s MedEffect [3], and so 
on. Moreover, some countries even publicly publish their 
SRS data to promote ADR researches [4]. 
However, the published SRS data also brings about 
some privacy threats. The SRS data [5] is a type of 
microdata that contains sensitive individual health 
information. The SRS data is associated with specific 
patients. For example, George gets liver cancer. He does 
not want anyone to know it. That is, it is private 
information. One day, George has ADR after taking a 
new drug. The ADR data is then published in SRS. 
Consequently, the adversary can get George’s private 
information by the ADR data. Therefore, the patient’s 
ADR should be protected to prevent this disclosure of 
identity and private information [6]. 
In general, publisher removes identity attributes 
before the data is published, such as Name, SSN, Phone, 
etc. However, even if all identity attributes have been 
removed, the adversary can still get the private 
information [7]. The adversary links the published data 
with external data (such as voter lists) through quasi-
identity attributes, such as Gender, Job, Age, ZIP code, 
etc. Therefore, many researches anonymize the SRS data 
before publishing it, such as k-anonymity [8]. 
In [9], Lin etc. point out that traditional anonymity 
methods are not applicable in SRS data. This is due to 
some characteristics of SRS data, including a large 
number of individual records, multi-value sensitive 
attributes, rare events, etc. Recently, a privacy protection 
model called MS has been proposed to anonymize SRS 
data to prevent the disclosure of individual privacy [10]. 
In the real world, new ADR data is published in SRS at 
any time. Thus, countries like the USA and Canada 
publish SRS data periodically (for example, quarterly) to 
handle this dynamically increasing datasets. However, 
MS is designed to be used in a single static publishing 
environment. Therefore, MS is very clumsy to handle a 
series of dynamic datasets. Once new data is published, 
continuous data publishing method [11] needs to 
anonymize all data. Thus, the data update is too costly. 
Dynamic data publishing method [12] only anonymizes 
unmodified data. Then an adversary could use the 
modified data to steal the privacy information. Therefore, 
this method is weak to against BFL-attacks (i.e. 
Backward-attack, Forward-attack, and Latest-attack [13]). 
To remove this issue, Wang etc. propose a method called 
PPMS [13]. PPMS can anonymize SRS data in the 
periodical data publishing scenario. Meanwhile, PPMS 
prevent the disclosure of personal sensitive information 
caused by BFL-attacks. However, PPMS has three 
shortcomings as follows. (1) Inefficient. When PPMS 
queries data with an old CaseID, it needs to filter the data 
to determine which data needs to be anonymized. Thus, it 
needs to develop a set of storage spaces to store the data 
that needs to be anonymized. These operations waste 
computing and storage resources. (2) The cost of updating 
is high. Necessarily, there is the latest case table to be 
published. When a new table is published, PPMS 
gradually anonymize the related data from the latest table 
to the oldest table. As a result, almost all of tables need to 
be re-anonymized. Therefore, the cost of such data 
updates is high. (3) Insecure. Q-values are the data which 
are valuable to the adversary. Thus, only Q-values need to 
be anonymized. PPMS use the coarse-grained judgment to 
expand the data range. Thus, after the anonymity, some 
attributes of Q-value are protected by very good 
anonymity. However, some other attributes of Q-value 
have reduced anonymity effect, which results in new 
security risks. 
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To remove these issues, we propose an Efficient Q-
value Zero-leakage protection scheme in SRS regularly 
publishing private data, which is called as EQZS. EQZS 
can find out the data that needs to be anonymized without 
the filtering operation. Thus, we effectively decrease the 
requirements of computing and storage resources. 
Meanwhile, EQZS anonymizes the related data from the 
oldest table to the latest table. Therefore, we almost only 
anonymize the new published table. Thus, we greatly 
reduce the cost of data updates. Finally, through the fine-
grained judgment to expand the data range, we ensure that 
each attribute of Q-value is protected by the maximum 
anonymity. Therefore, we enhance the security. 
 
1.1 Research Motivation 
 
Usually each record of SRS data contains a CaseID to 
track the subsequent behavior of the event [14]. All 
records with the same CaseID point to the same patient. 
Before publication, all records are anonymized for 
protecting individual privacy. Unfortunately, the CaseID 
also provides a useful link for adversary through a series 
of anonymous datasets. By the link, the adversary can 
exclude those records that they do not want to steal. 
The following examples reflect our challenges. For 
better illustration, let us consider the three consecutive 
quarters of the published SRS datasets in Tabs. 1(a), 1(b) 
and 1(c). Each quarter’s data satisfies k-anonymity (k = 3). 
In another word, Fig. 1 shows three anonymized case 
tables: R0, R1 and R2 (i.e. TableID = 0, 1 and 2).Each table 
contains five attributes: LineID, CaseID, Sex, Age and 
Disease. LineID is for our fine-grained judgment. CaseID 
and Disease are public for ADR. Only Sex and Age can 
be anonymized. Therefore, Sex and Age are the Q-value. 
Each line of a case table is a case. We use ri,j to denote a 
case, where i denotes the TableID and j denotes the 
LineID. For example, r1,2 = {14, ANY,  [20, 30], HIV}. In 
addition, we use ri,j. Attribute to specifically denote a data. 
For example, r1,2∙CaseID = 14, r1,2∙Sex = ANY, etc. 
Besides, we use CaseIDi to denote all CaseIDs in case 
table Ri. 
Attack 1: Backward-attack. We assume an 
adversary knows that his neighbor Kitty had a Q-value 
{female, 22}. Meanwhile, he also knows that Kitty 
suffered from some adverse drug reactions in Quarter 2. 
First, the adversary links the Q-value with Tab. 1(b). Then 
he learns that Kitty’s records are in CaseIDset {11, 14, 
17}. Second, he links the possible CaseID set {11, 14, 17} 
with previous published Tab. 1(a). In Tab. 1(a), the Sex 
with CaseID = 11 is male. However, the Sex of Kitty is 
female. Therefore, he can exclude the CaseID 11 from the 
possible CaseID set. This makes the original 3-
anonymous information records to be 2-anonymous by 
Tab. 1(b). This makes it easier for adversary to steal 
Kitty’s information. 
Attack 2: Forward-attack. Based on the above 
operation, the adversary knows that Kitty’s information is 
in the possible CaseID set {14, 17}. Now, the adversary 
can further use this possible CaseID set to link to the 
subsequently published SRS data. In Tab. 1(c), the sex 
with CaseID = 17 is male. Thus, the adversary can 
exclude the CaseID 17 from the possible CaseID set. That 
is, he concludes that Kitty’s CaseID is 14. 
Attack 3: Latest-attack. We assume an adversary 
knows that his neighbor Tony’s Q-value is {male, 23}. 
Meanwhile, he also knows that Tony had adverse drug 
reactions in Quarter 3 first time. This means that Tony’s 
CaseID is definitely a new CaseID in Quarter 3. That is, 
Tony’s CaseID cannot appear in any previously published 
data. First, the adversary links the Q-value with Tab. 1(c). 
He gets the possible CaseID set {17, 3, 21}. However, 
CaseIDs 17 and 3 appear in Tab. 1(b). Therefore, he 
concludes that Tony’s CaseID is 21. 
 
Table 1 The published SRS datasets in the three consecutive quarters 
(a) R0: QUARTER 1  
LineID CaseID Sex Age Disease 
1 11 Male [25, 30] Fever 
2 8 Male [25, 30] Flu 
3 6 Male [25, 30] Diabetes 
4 14 Female [25, 30] HIV 
5 15 Female [25, 30] Flu 
6 16 Female [25, 30] Diabetes 
(b) R1: QUARTER 2 
LineID CaseID Sex Age Disease 
1 11 ANY [20, 30] Fever 
2 14 ANY [20, 30] HIV 
3 17 ANY [20, 30] Diabetes 
4 3 Male [25, 30] Flu 
5 19 Male [25, 30] Flu 
6 20 Male [25, 30] Fever 
7 31 Male [25, 30] HIV 
8 42 Male [25, 30] Flu 
(c) R2: QUARTER 3 
LineID CaseID Sex Age Disease 
1 33 Female [20, 30] Flu 
2 9 Female [20, 30] Diabetes 
3 35 Female [20, 30] HIV 
4 5 Female [25, 30] Flu 
5 47 Female [25, 30] Fever 
6 17 Male [15, 30] Diabetes 
7 3 Male [15, 30] Flu 
8 21 Male [15, 30] HIV 
 
From the above examples, we can find that even if 
the published table has been anonymized, it is still going 
to be cracked by BFL-attacks. Therefore, we need to 
propose a secure and efficient privacy protection model to 
re-anonymize the Q-value to improve the security. 
 
1.2 Our Contributions 
 
Our contributions are illustrated as follows. 
(1) We propose a new privacy protection model. Our 
model directly expands the data range during the 
comparison judgment. When a data’s range does not need 
to be expanded, we directly exit the loop. That is, we omit 
the filtering operation. Thus, we improve the computing 
efficiency and reduce the storage cost. 
(2) We propose a new anonymity frame. Our frame 
gradually anonymizes the related Q-value from the oldest 
table to the latest table. Thus, when a new table is 
published, we almost only need to anonymize this new 
table. Therefore, we greatly reduce the cost of data 
updates. 
(3) We propose a new fine-grained judgment method. 
Our method does not anonymize the entire line of Q-value. 
We make a fine-grained judgment of a single attribute of 
a Q-value. After the fine-grained judgment, we ensure 
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that each attribute of a Q-value is protected by the 
maximum anonymity. Therefore, we enhance the security. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we review the related works. In Section 3, we 
study the three attack modes of BFL. Section 4 provides 
our core algorithm against BFL-attacks. In Section 5, we 
compare the EQZS with existing methods by experiments. 
In Sections 6, we conclude this paper. 
 
2 RELATED WORKS 
2.1 Continuous Data Publishing 
 
Continuous data publishing means that if a data 
owner wants to publish data, he needs to publish all 
collected data, even if some data has been published [15]. 
In other words, if a data owner has previously collected a 
set of data D1 at timestamp t1 and published R1 (i.e. the 
anonymized version of D1), the data owner then collects a 
new set of data D2 at timestamp t2. Then he should publish 
R2 (the anonymized version of D2) as an anonymized 
version of all collected data (i.e. D1∪D2). In general, the 
published version Ri (i ≥ 1) should be the anonymized 
version of D1∪D2∪... ∪Di. 
The definition of continuous data publishing shows 
that privacy protection models [11, 16] proposed in this 
scenario have a common problem. They need to 
anonymize all collected data. Once new data is published, 
they need to anonymize all data to ensure that the private 
data will not be leaked. Thus, the data update is too costly. 
Our scheme EQZS gradually anonymizes the data from 
oldest timestamp to latest timestamp. Thus, when a new 
dataset is published, we almost only need to anonymize 
this new dataset. That is, we greatly reduce the cost of 
data updates. 
 
2.2 Dynamic Data Publishing 
 
In a dynamic data publishing scenario, data owner 
can insert and/or delete data from the original dataset [17]. 
If a data owner collects a dataset D1 at timestamp t1 and 
publishes R1 (i.e. the anonymized version of D1), he 
continuously collects new data and inserts them into D1 
during the time period [t1, t2). In addition, he may delete 
and update some data from D1. Finally, he obtains an 
updated version D2 of D1 at timestampt2. Then the version 
R2 published at timestamp t2 is the anonymized version of 
D2. In fact, the version Ri published at timestamp ti is the 
anonymized version of Di. 
According to the definition of dynamic data 
publishing, when the published data is modified, the 
published version is modified accordingly. If privacy 
protection methods [12, 18] proposed in this scenario do 
not anonymize the modified published version, the 
adversary can steal privacy data from the modified 
published version. If these methods anonymize the 
modified published version, the data update is too costly. 
In our scheme EQZS, we use a fine-grained judgment to 
anonymize all modified published version by pre-finding 
old CaseIDs. Our anonymity frame provides higher 




2.3 Regularly Data Publishing 
 
PPMS [13] is the most classic privacy protection 
method proposed for the regularly data publishing 
scenario. Meanwhile, PPMS is the most relevant method 
to our challenges. In this method, data owner regularly 
publishes new data (such as SRS data). A data owner 
collects a dataset D1 during the time period [t0, t1) and 
publishes R1 (i.e. the anonymized version of D1) at 
timestamp t1. Next, he collects a dataset D2 during the 
time period [t1, t2) and publishes R2. R1 and R2 may have 
the same CaseID, i.e. r1,i∙CaseID = r2,j∙CaseID. Then 
r1,i∙CaseID is the old CaseID of r2,j∙CaseID. 
However, PPMS has four shortcomings as follows. 
(1) High memory consumption. In Tab. 1, r0,1∙CaseID 
= 11 = r1,1∙CaseID and r0,4∙CaseID = 14 = r1,2∙CaseID. 
Thus, r0,1∙CaseID and r0,4∙CaseID are old cases. PPMS 
needs to filter CaseIDs to find the old CaseID. Based on 
the old CaseID, PPMS can find the Q-value that needs to 
be anonymized. Therefore, PPMS needs to store r1,1 and 
r1,2 into memory. However, these two data both do not 
need to be anonymized. Our scheme omits the filter 
operation. We do not store these two data into memory. 
We only store the data that needs to be anonymized into 
memory. Thus, we decrease the memory consumption. 
(2) Low computing efficiency. PPMS needs to run a 
loop for the filter operation. We omit the unnecessary 
loop to enhance the computing efficiency. 
(3) High update cost. PPMS compares Ri with Ri−1 to 
possibly anonymize Ri and Ri−1. Next, PPMS compares 
Ri−1 with Ri−2 to possibly anonymize Ri−1 and Ri−2, and so 
on until the initial table R1 is compared. As a result, when 
a new table Ri+1 is published, PPMS needs to re-
anonymize almost all of tables. Thus, the cost of data 
updates is very high. Our scheme EQZS gradually 
possibly anonymizes related Q-values from R1 to Ri. That 
is, we firstly compare R1 with R2 to possibly anonymize 
R1 and R2. Next, we compare R2 with R3 to possibly 
anonymize R2 and R3, and so on until the latest table Ri is 
possibly anonymized. Therefore, when a new table Ri+1 is 
published, we only need to possibly anonymize Ri+1 and 
Ri. Therefore, we greatly improve the efficiency of data 
update. 
(4) Not secure enough. When the range of a Q-value 
{ri,j∙q1, ri,j∙q2} needs to be expanded by an old Q-value 
{ri−1,k∙q1, ri−1,k∙q2}, PPMS directly assigns ri−1,k∙q1 to ri,j∙q1 
and ri−1,k∙q2 to ri,j∙q2 (i.e. ri,j∙q1= ri−1,k∙q1 and ri,j∙q2= ri−1,k∙q2). 
If ri−1,k∙q1>ri,j∙q1 and ri−1,k∙q2>ri,j∙q2, this is certainly fine. 
However, if ri−1,k∙q1>ri,j∙q1 and ri−1,k∙q2<ri,j∙q2, ri,j∙q1 is well 
protected anonymously but the range of ri,j∙q2 is narrowed. 
That is, PPMS’s coarse-grained judgment results in new 
security risks. Our fine-grained judgment protects each 
attribute of a Q-value by maximum anonymity. Therefore, 




Definition 1. (Coverage of Q-value). Given case 
table Ri, we need to compare Ri with Ri−1 to find Ri’s Q-
value that needs to be anonymized. ri,j denotes a case, 
where i is the TableID and j is the LineID. The range of 
ri,j’s attribute q is denoted by ri,j∙q. If ri,j∙CaseID = 
ri−1,k∙CaseID and ri,j∙q< ri−1,k∙q, we define that ri−1,k∙q 
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covers ri,j∙q. In other words, ri,j∙q has a smaller range and 
has a worse anonymity effect. In this situation, the range 
of ri,j∙q needs to be expanded by ri−1,k∙q (i.e. ri,j∙q=ri−1,k∙q). 
For example, r2,6∙CaseID = 17 = r1,3∙CaseID and 
r2,6∙Sex = Male < r1,3∙Sex = ANY, so r2,6∙Sex needs to be 
expanded by r1,3∙Sex (i.e. r2,6∙Sex = ANY). 
The core of BFL-attacks is to exclude cases from case 
tables by coverage judgment. When the number of 





If an old Q-value cannot cover the new Q-value, the 
adversary can exclude the old case from case table.  
Definition 2. (Backward-attack). R denotes all case 
tables in the system. If there are ri,j ∈ R ∧ ri−1,k ∈ R ∧ 
ri,j∙CaseID = ri−1,k∙CaseID ∧ ri,j∙q ≥ ri−1,k∙q, Backward-
attack happens. In this situation, the adversary can 




If a new Q-value cannot cover the old Q-value, the 
adversary can exclude the new case from case table.  
Definition 3. (Forward-attack). R denotes all case 
tables in the system. If there are ri,j ∈ R ∧ ri+1,k ∈ R ∧ 
ri,j∙CaseID = ri+1,k∙CaseID ∧ ri,j∙q ≥ ri+1,k∙q, Forward-attack 





The adversary knows that a patient had ADR at 
timestamp ti first time. Thus, his cases definitely do not 
exist in previously published version. Given a possible 
CaseID ri,j∙CaseID of the patient, if previously published 
version includes ri,j∙CaseID, ri,j can be excluded. 
Definition 4. (Latest-attack). R denotes all case 
tables in the system. If there are ri,j ∈ R ∧ ri−l,k ∈ R ∧ 
ri,j∙CaseID = ri−l,k∙CaseID ∧ ri,j shouid be published at 
timestamp ti first time, Latest-attack happens. In this 
situation, the adversary can exclude ri,j from R. 
 
4 EQZS 
4.1 Core Idea 
 
Our core idea is composed of the following seven 
parts. 
(1) Against Backward-attack. If the old Q-value 
cannot cover the new Q-value, the old case can be 
excluded from the possible case set. Thus, if we assign the 
larger range of new Q-value to the old Q-value, the old Q-
value then can cover the new Q-value. That is, we 
effectively stop Backward-attack. 
(2) Against Forward-attack. If the new Q-value 
cannot cover the old Q-value, the new case can be 
excluded from the possible case set. Thus, if we assign the 
larger range of old Q-value to the new Q-value, the new 
Q-value then can cover the old Q-value. That is, we 
effectively stop Forward-attack. 
(3) Against Latest-attack. Possible CaseID set 
CaseIDi should be published at timestamp ti first time. If 
CaseIDi includes old CaseID, Latest-attack happens. To 
against Latest-attack, we firstly remove the leaked old 
CaseID from CaseIDi. Secondly, we add new secure 
CaseID into CaseIDi. That is, we create a new case set 
that has k cases. Then we anonymize this new case set by 
k-anonymity. It is clear that we can effectively stop 
Latest-attack. 
(4) Low memory consumption. We omit the filter 
operation. We only store the data that needs to be 
anonymized into memory to decrease the memory 
consumption.  
(5) High computing efficiency. We omit the 
unnecessary loop to enhance the computing efficiency. 
(6)  Low update cost. When a new table is published, 
we almost only need to possibly anonymize the new table 
to improve the efficiency of data update. 
(7)  High Security. Our fine-grained judgment 
protects each attribute of a Q-value by maximum 




Algorithm 1 shows our core idea. The algorithm takes 
an old table set R, the table number x, anonymity number 
k and Q-value as input. Meanwhile, it takes the new 
anonymized table set Rnew as output.  
Phase 1 (Steps 1-20). This phase finds out all the data 
that might be attacked by BFL-attacks. First, Algorithm 1 
finds out all old CaseIDs (Steps 5-7). Second, we find out 
all cases that need to be possibly anonymized (Steps 8-10). 
Third, Algorithm 1assigns the larger range of new Q-
value to the old Q-value against Backward-attack (Steps 
13-14).  
Phase 2 (Steps 21-29). This phase is used to against 
forward-attack. If the range of old Q-value is larger than 
new Q-value (Step 24), we assign the larger range of old 
Q-value to the new Q-value (Step 25). Meanwhile, the 
case in this phase needs to be protected by k-anonymity. 
Phase 3 (Steps 30-47). This phase is used to against 
and Latest-attack. If OC=Ø (Step 32), the ranges of all 
attacked Q-values have been expanded. Thus, we do not 
need to use k-anonymity. Algorithm 1 ends. If there is no 
enough case for k-anonymity (Step 32), Algorithm 1 also 
ends. If Algorithm 1 does not end, first, we randomly 
select a secure case set Rn from Table Ri(Step 34). 
Meanwhile, the number of Rn is k. Therefore, we can use 
k-anonymity to protect new case set (Steps 35-40). 
We take Tab. 1 as an example to illustrate Algorithm 
1. Thus, we run EQZS(R, 3, 3, "Sex, Age").  
Comparison 1. We compare R1 with R0. First (Steps 
5-7), Algorithm 1 finds an old CaseID set OC = 
{r1,1∙CaseID = 11, r1,2∙CaseID = 14}. Second (Steps 8-10), 
r1,1∙Sex = ANY > r0,1∙Sex = Male and r1,1∙Age = [20, 30] > 
r0,1∙Age = [25, 30]. Thus, r0,1∙Sex = r1,1∙Sex = ANY and 
r0,1∙Age = r1,1∙Age = [20, 30] (Steps 13-14). By the same 
way, the ranges of r0,4 need to be expanded too. That is, 
OA=Ø.  
Comparison 2. We compare R2 with R1. First(Steps 5-
7), we find an old CaseID set OC={r2,6∙CaseID = 17, 
r2,7∙CaseID = 3}. Second(Steps 8-12), r2,6∙Sex = Male < 
r1,3∙Sex = ANY and r2,7∙Sex = Male = r1,4∙Sex ∧ r2,7∙Age = 
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[15, 30] > r1,4∙Age = [25, 30]. Thus, r1,4∙Age = r2,7∙Age = 
[15, 30] (Steps 13-14), OA = {r2,6} and OC = 
{r2,7∙CaseID}. Third (Steps 21-29), as r2,6∙Sex = Male < 
r1,3∙Sex = ANY and r2,6∙Age = [15, 30] > r1,3∙Age = [20, 
30]. Therefore, r2,6∙Sex = r1,3∙Sex = ANY. However, the 
range of r2,6∙Age does not need to be expanded. 
Fourth(Steps 30-47), we randomly select a secure case set 
Rn={r2,1, r2,3, r2,8}. Then, r2,1∙Sex = r2,6∙Sex = ANY, 
r2,1∙Age = r2,6∙Age = [15, 30], r2,3∙Sex = r2,6∙Sex = ANY, 
r2,3∙Age = r2,6∙Age = [15, 30] and r2,8∙Sex = r2,6∙Sex = 
ANY. 
All re-anonymized information has been highlighted 
by blue color in Tab. 2. 
Algorithm 1: EQZS 
Input: R, x, k, Q-value 
Output: Rnew
 1 OC=Ø// A set of old CaseIDs  
2 OA=Ø// A set of cases that need to be possibly anonymized 
3 i=1 
4 While i<x do 
5 For all ri,j.CaseID∈CaseIDi do 
6 If ri,j.CaseID∈CaseIDi-1∧ri,j.CaseID==ri-1,p.CaseID then 
7 OC=OC∪ri,j.CaseID 
8   For all q∈Q-value do 
9 If ri,j.q<ri-1,p.q then 
10 OA=OA∪ri,j 
11  Remove ri,j.CaseID from OC 
12  Exit 
13 Else 
14 ri-1,p.q=ri,j.q 
15 End if 
16 End for 
17 End if 
18 End for 
19 i ++ 
20 End while 
21 If OA≠ Ø then 
22 For all ri,j∈OA do 
23 For all q∈Q-value do 
24 If ri,j.CaseID==ri-1,p.CaseID∧ri,j.q<ri-1,p.q then 
25 ri,j.q=ri-1,p.q 
26 End if 
27 End for 
28 End for 
29 End if 
30 i=1 
31 ON=Ø   //New case sets for k-anonymity 
32 While OC≠Ø∧(ON∪OA) ⊂ Ri∧OA≠Ø do 
33 If ∃ri,j∈OA then 
34 Randomly select a case set Rn from Table Ri∧Rn has k 
cases∧Rn∩(OC∪OA∪ON)== Ø 
35 For all ri,p∈Rn do 
36 For all q∈Q-value do 
37 If ri,j.q>ri,p.q then 
38 ri,p.q=ri,j.q 
39 End if 
40 End for 
41 End for 
42 ON= ON∪Rn∪ri,j 
43 Reomve ri,j from OA 
44 End if 
45 End while 
46 Let the new anonymized table set be Rnew 
47 ReturnRnew 
Table 2 The re-anonymized Tab. 1 
(a) R0: QUARTER 1 
LineID CaseID Sex Age Disease 
1 11 ANY [20, 30] Fever 
2 8 Male [25, 30] Flu 
3 6 Male [25, 30] Diabetes 
4 14 ANY [20, 30] HIV 
5 15 Female [25, 30] Flu 
6 16 Female [25, 30] Diabetes 
(b) R1: QUARTER 2 
LineID CaseID Sex Age Disease 
1 11 ANY [20, 30] Fever 
2 14 ANY [20, 30] HIV 
3 17 ANY [20, 30] Diabetes 
4 3 Male [15, 30] Flu 
5 19 Male [25, 30] Flu 
6 20 Male [25, 30] Fever 
7 31 Male [25, 30] HIV 
8 42 Male [25, 30] Flu 
Table 2 The re-anonymized Tab. 1 (continuation) 
(c) R2: QUARTER 3 
LineID CaseID Sex Age Disease 
1 33 ANY [15, 30] Flu 
2 9 Female [20, 30] Diabetes 
3 35 ANY [15, 30] HIV 
4 5 Female [25, 30] Flu 
5 47 Female [25, 30] Fever 
6 17 ANY [15, 30] Diabetes 
7 3 Male [15, 30] Flu 
8 21 ANY [15, 30] HIV 
4.3 Analysis 
The attribute number of Q-value is unlikely to be 
large. Thus, we do not consider it. We suppose that the 
maximum number of cases in a table is n and the number 
of tables in the system is m. PPMS has one more 
computational loop than EQZS for the filter operation. 
Meanwhile, we almost only anonymize the new table to 
greatly improve the data update efficiency. Therefore, the 
complexities of these two methods are shown in Tab. 3. 




efficiency Data update 
PPMS [13] O(2×n×m) O(n2×m) O(n×m) 
EQZS O(n×m) O(n×m) O(n) 
We need to prove that our anonymity by comparing 
Ri and Ri-1 is secure enough to against BFL-attacks. 
Theorem 1. (Anonymity transitivity). Given a 
random attribute q and three cases ri−1,j, ri,p and ri+1,h with 
the same CaseID from three tables Ri−1, Ri and Ri+1 
respectively, after our re-anonymity, if ri−1,j∙q ≤ ri,p∙q  and 
ri,p∙q ≤ ri+1,h∙q, obviously there must be ri−1,j∙q ≤ ri+1,h∙q. 
Meanwhile, each Q-value is protected by the k-anonymity. 
Therefore, we can ensure the security without comparing 
Ri+1 with Ri−1. 
5 EXPERIMENTS 
To verify the practicability and efficiency of our 
scheme in the anonymous SRS dataset, we compare our 
EQZS with the most classic and most relevant method 
PPMS through the following experiments. 
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5.1 Experimental Setup 
 
Visual C++ 6.0 is used in all experiments. The 
experiment uses a computer with a 3.4GHZ dual-core 
CPU and 32GB memory. The k-anonymity number is k = 
6. We use the real case data in our affiliated hospital. 
Each Q-value has 5 attributes in our case tables. When we 
compare EQZS with PPMS, the two methods are always 
under the same dataset.  
In our system, the case number n is from 2T (T 
denotes Thousand) to 10T and table number m is from 
100 to 500. The specific parameters are shown in Tab. 4. 
 
Table 4 The specific parameters 
n 2T 4T 6T 8T 10T 
m 100 200 300 400 500 
 
5.2 Memory Consumption 
 
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 1, where 
the X-axis represents the table number m, the Y-axis 
represents the case number n (whose unit is T) and the Z-




Figure 1 The comparison of memory consumption 
 
When m = 100 and n = 2T grow to m = 500 and n = 
10T, the memory consumption of PPMS is almost 1.37-
fold that of EQZS. PPMS needs to filter the data to 
determine which data needs to be anonymized. Thus, it 
needs to develop a set of storage spaces to store the data. 
However, we omit the filter operation. Thus, we pay a 
fewer memory consumption than PPMS. 
 
5.3 Anonymity Efficiency 
 
In this section, we focus on the anonymity efficiency 
by anonymizing all tables in the system. We use 
anonymity time to represent the running time. Thus, the 
experimental results are shown in Fig. 2. The Y-axes 
represents the anonymity time whose unit is millisecond 
(ms). The X-axes of Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) represent table 
number m and case number n respectively. In Fig. 2(a), n 
= 2T and in Fig. 2(b), m = 100. 
(1) Fig. 2(a). PPMS filters some data that needs to be 
anonymized. Our scheme omits this filter operation. 
Therefore, in the process of m growing from 100 to 500, 
EQZS consumes less anonymity time than PPMS. 
Through calculations, we find that the anonymity time of 
EQZS is only 79.95% of PPMS. 
(2) Fig. 2(b). When the case number n grows from 2T 
to 10T, the growth rate of EQZS’s anonymity time is 
lower than PPMS. First, PPMS needs to compare the data 
in the case table to achieve the filter operation. Second, 
PPMS use the filtered data for the next phase of 
anonymity operations. However, we omit the filter 
operation. Therefore, more cases bring more differences 
between PPMS and EQZS. 
 
 
(a) Table number 
 
(b) Case number 
Figure 2 The comparison of anonymity efficiency 
 
5.4 Data Update 
 
When a new table is published, the update time for 
the anonymity is shown in Fig. 3. Where the Y-axes 
represents the update time whose unit is microsecond (μs). 
The X-axes of Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) represent table number m 
and case number n respectively. In Fig. 3(a), n = 2T and 
in Fig. 3(b), m = 100. 
(1) Fig. 3(a). When table number m grows from 100 
to 500, EQZS’s update time barely changes. However, 
PPMS’s update time linearly increases with m. When a 
new table is published, PPMS needs to anonymize almost 
all tables and EQZS only needs to anonymize the new 
table. Therefore, EQZS has a lot more performance than 
PPMS on data update. 
(2) Fig. 3(b). In the process of n growing from 2T to 
10T, EQZS only needs to judge two tables with 2T to 10T 
Zongmin CUI et al.: Efficient Q-Value Zero-Leakage Protection Scheme in SRS Regularly Publishing Private Data 
Tehnički vjesnik 26, 3(2019), 695-702                                                                                                                                                                                                             701 
cases. However, PPMS needs to judge almost all tables. 
Thus, our scheme has better data update performance than 
PPMS 
Besides, comparing the experimental results in Figs. 
2 and 3, we find that the running time of data update is 
obviously fewer than initial re-anonymity. This is because 
many Q-values do not need be re-anonymized again for 
data update after the initial re-anonymity. 
 
 
(a) Table number 
 
(b) Case number 




BFL-attacks exist in many of the existing data (for 
example, SRS, electronic health Records (EHR), etc.). 
The existing methods for BFL-attack have some 
shortcomings in memory consumption, anonymity 
efficiency, data update and anonymity security. To 
remove these shortcomings, we propose an efficient Q-
value zero-leakage protection scheme in SRS regularly 
publishing private data. Our scheme omits the filter 
operation to reduce the memory consumption and 
improve the anonymity efficiency. Meanwhile, we almost 
only anonymize the new published table to improve the 
efficiency of data update. In addition, we show a fine-
grained judgment frame to enhance the security. Though 
the experiment analysis and security proof, we can draw 
the following conclusions. 
(1)  The comprehensive performance of our scheme 
is significantly better than that of most existing methods. 
(2)  Since each attribute of our Q-values is protected 
by maximum anonymity, we have a better privacy 
protection effect than most of existing methods. 
(3)  Because of its excellent data update performance, 
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